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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of alternative forms of regulation on the market 
penetration and capacity, which are determined by a profit-maximizing monopolist providing  
priority service to consumers.  For continuous priority service, a minimum reliability standard, 
price cap and rate of return regulation lead to larger capacity than in the absence of regulation.  
A minimum reliability standard reduces the market penetration while price cap and rate of return 
regulation increase it.  The regulatory effects on the market penetration and capacity are also 
examined for discrete priority service, and policy implications of these effects are discussed for 
electricity supply industry.    
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification Number: D45, L51  
Keywords: priority service, monopoly, minimum reliability standard, price cap, rate of return 
regulation 
 
Correspondence: Isamu Matsukawa, Professor 
Faculty of Economics, Musashi University 
            1-26-1 Toyotama-kami, Nerima-ku, Tokyo 176-8534, Japan. 
              Phone: +81-3-5984-3769, Fax: +81-3-3991-1198 
            E-mail: matukawa@cc.musashi.ac.jp    
 
 
*The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Musashi University Research 
Center. 
 
 2
1. INTRODUCTION 
Priority service is a nonlinear pricing mechanism that efficiently rations the usage of 
scarce resources through consumer self-selection of a reliability level of service (Harris and 
Raviv, 1981; Chao and Wilson, 1987; Viswanathan and Tse, 1989; Wilson, 1989; Spulber, 1993; 
Crew and Fernando, 1994).  Based on a knowledge of the distribution of consumers’ 
willingness to pay for the service, suppliers of priority service design a menu of options 
characterized by service reliability and prices.  Prior to the provision of service, consumers 
choose the level of reliability that maximizes their expected surplus.  When the capacity of the 
supply facility is insufficient, suppliers ration consumers’ usage according to the reliability level 
that each consumer has chosen.  
The electricity supply industry has significant potential for applying priority service to 
consumers.  In fact, ‘standard’ supply and ‘interruptible’ supply contracts are often applied on 
an optional basis to electricity transmission and distribution.  Although generation of 
electricity has been liberalized in many countries, local monopoly is still a dominant structure 
for transmission and distribution sectors.  In these sectors, how to regulate the monopolist that 
offers priority service is an important policy issue, because there is a serious concern about the 
lack of incentives for the monopolist to properly expand the capacity of transmission and 
distribution facilities.  Because the investment costs of these facilities are substantial, the 
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monopolist may choose to constrain investment so that the rationing of the usage of the facilities 
frequently occurs.  Although the application of priority service attains efficient rationing in the 
short run, it may result in inefficient investment in the facilities in the long run. 
A straightforward way of securing a sufficient level of capacity is to impose a 
minimum reliability constraint on the monopolist.  In electricity supply, a reliability level can 
be defined in terms of an engineering index, for example, as the product of annual duration and 
frequency of supply interruption per consumer who experienced power interruption.  This 
reliability regulation prevents excessive rationing and requires transmission and distribution 
monopolists to properly expand their network facilities to observe minimum reliability 
requirements.  Although minimum reliability regulation is expected to achieve secure supply 
of the service, it may result in the exit of additional consumers who prefer an inexpensive 
service, thereby reducing welfare if the regulator sets a substantially high minimum reliability 
standard.  
Rate of return regulation, which has been a traditional form of regulating the 
investment of utilities, is an alternative way of securing service reliability.  Rate of return 
regulation is expected to achieve a secure supply of service by providing a monopolist with 
economic incentives for investment, however, it leads to an allocatively inefficient choice of 
input in production (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1980).  In contrast with a minimum reliability 
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standard, reliability levels of lower priority are not directly regulated.  Thus, the monopolist 
can lower service reliability to consumers preferring inexpensive service through an increase in 
market penetration, while it can achieve a high reliability for consumers preferring high priority 
through additional investment.  
Rate of return regulation has raised a serious concern about substantial regulatory 
costs and the lack of incentives for the regulated monopolist to reduce production costs.  This 
concern has led to the application of price cap regulation, which imposes a ceiling on the price 
level of service, to such industries as telecommunications, water, gas, and electricity supply.  
Price cap regulation is expected to raise the number of consumers receiving the service by 
constraining the price level of service.  However, the application of price cap regulation to the 
monopolist offering priority service leads to excessive rationing if the monopolist does not have 
any incentive to expand the capacity of the facilities.  
This paper investigates how these alternative forms of regulation affect the market 
penetration and capacity of the facilities of a profit-maximizing monopolist that offers priority 
service to consumers.  A benchmark for the analysis is the case of an unregulated 
profit-maximizing monopolist that restricts market penetration and investment, thereby reducing 
social welfare.  For continuous priority service, both a minimum reliability standard and rate of 
return regulation lead to larger capacity than in the absence of regulation.  Both regulatory 
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schemes raise reliability levels for all priority classes except the highest, whose reliability is 
always equal to unity for continuous priority service when reliability is defined as the 
probability that service is supplied.  While a minimum reliability standard leads to the exit of 
consumers preferring inexpensive service from the market, rate of return regulation raises 
market penetration through the provision of an inexpensive service with a low reliability.  Price 
cap regulation also raises market penetration through the provision of an inexpensive service 
with a low reliability.  Surprisingly, price cap regulation leads to larger capacity than in the 
absence of regulation because the prices of higher priority classes reflect the surplus loss of 
consumers choosing lower priority.  To lower the prices of higher priority classes, the regulated 
monopolist must reduce the surplus loss of lower priority consumers.  Capacity addition 
contributes to this reduction.  
The analysis of regulatory effects on market penetration and capacity is extended to 
the case where the number of priority classes is finite and each reliability level is discrete.  
Price cap regulation also results in an increase in market penetration in the case of discrete 
priority service, while the effect of rate of return regulation on market penetration is not obvious.  
As with continuous priority service, rate of return regulation also increases capacity, while the 
effect of price cap regulation on capacity is not obvious in the discrete case.  In contrast with 
continuous priority service where the reliability of the highest priority class is independent of 
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capacity, any change in capacity affects the reliability of the highest priority class in discrete 
priority service.  Thus, for the price of the highest priority to be lowered, it is necessary either 
to reduce the surplus loss of consumers choosing lower reliability or to reduce the reliability of 
the highest priority class.  For discrete priority service, price cap regulation lowers capacity in 
comparison with an unregulated monopoly if the reduction in the surplus of the highest class 
consumers, because of the lowered reliability, exceeds the reduction of the surplus loss of lower 
priority consumers.  The effects of a minimum reliability standard on discrete priority service 
are the same as those on continuous priority service.  
The literature on priority service has mainly focused on how to design the menu of 
service and seldom on regulatory issues.1  The issue of how to regulate the monopolist offering 
priority service is closely related to the literature on product differentiation of the regulated 
monopolist.  Besanko et al. (1987) make a comparison of price cap regulation with a minimum 
quality standard in the context of vertical product differentiation.  Besanko and Donnenfeld 
(1988) examine the effects of rate of return regulation on product variety.  In these studies, the 
quality level for one class of service is independent from that of another class of service.  The 
paper applies these regulatory schemes to markets where service quality is defined as priority 
assigned to each class of service, and the service quality chosen by consumers with a lower 
willingness to pay depends on the service quality chosen by those with a higher willingness to 
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pay.  Despite this difference in the characteristic of service quality, regulatory impacts on 
market penetration in this paper are consistent with those of Besanko et al. (1987) and Besanko 
and Donnenfeld (1988).  That is, a minimum quality standard decreases market penetration 
while both price cap regulation and rate of return regulation increase it.  The paper extends the 
analysis to discrete differentiation of service reliability, which has more practical relevance than 
continuous differentiation, while Besanko et al. (1987) and Besanko and Donnenfeld (1988) 
only examine continuous differentiation of product quality.  
Section 2 describes a basic model of monopolistic provision of priority service with a 
continuous set of classes of the service.  Section 3 investigates how alternative forms of 
regulating reliability, price, and investment affect market penetration and capacity.  Section 4 
extends the model to priority service with discrete classes, and compares welfare effects of 
alternative regulatory schemes based on an illustrative numerical example with two classes of 
priority service.  Section 5 applies a model of priority service to the electricity supply industry 
and discusses policy implications of regulatory impacts on market penetration and capacity.  
Section 6 summarizes the results of the paper.  The appendix section presents derivation of the 
objective function, proofs of propositions, and the effects of average reliability regulation on 
market penetration and capacity. 
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2. THE MODEL 
A monopolist is assumed to provide each consumer with one unit of product that is 
supplied through the use of the monopolist’s facilities.  Prior to supplying the product, the 
monopolist chooses a level of capacity of these facilities.  The amount of available capacity is 
uncertain, and the supply of the product is rationed whenever the level of available capacity is 
less than the total demand for the product.  The probability that the available capacity of the 
monopolist’s facilities is equal to or larger than X units of total demand is described by F(X, K), 
where K is the level of capacity the monopolist has chosen prior to the provision of the product.  
It is assumed that FX(X, K) < 0 and FK(X, K) > 0, where a subscript stands for a partial derivative 
of the function.  These assumptions imply that a decrease in total demand and an increase in 
capacity raises service reliability.  Information about F(X, K) is known to the monopolist and 
the regulator prior to the provision of the service. 
Prior to the supply of the service, the monopolist offers consumers with a menu of 
tariff options characterized by two non-negative continuous variables: the reliability level of the 
service, denoted by r, and the price of the service, denoted by p.2  Consumers subscribe to one 
of these tariff options, and those choosing a lower reliability level are rationed more frequently 
than those choosing a higher reliability level.  A price function that is optimal for consumers, 
denoted by p(r), describes the charge a consumer would pay for service reliability r for one unit 
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of product over the time interval subject to supply interruption.  The consumer’s willingness to 
pay for the supply of service is denoted by v, whose distribution is described by D(v) over the 
interval [0, V].  It is assumed that D(v) is twice differentiable, Dv(v) < 0 and Dvv(v)  0.  
Without loss of generality, the highest value of the consumers’ willingness to pay is normalized 
so that V = 1.  The willingness to pay is private information, and the monopolist only knows 
the distribution about the willingness to pay prior to offering priority service. 
The expected surplus that a consumer obtains from the service, denoted by S, is 
defined as the difference between the expected utility, which is a function of service reliability 
and the consumer’s willingness to pay for the service, and the price of the service, which is a 
function of service reliability: 
 
S = u(r, v) − p(r),                                                 (1) 
 
where the expected utility is represented by a thrice-continuously differentiable function u(r, v) 
with u(0, v) = 0 and u(r, 0) = 0.  That r = 0 is taken as equivalent to the decision of not 
receiving the service at any time.  The utility function is assumed to satisfy the following 
properties:3 
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(i) ur(r, v) > 0 for ∈v (0, 1], and ur(r, 0) = 0, 
(ii) uv(r, v) > 0 (∀ r > 0), 
  (iii) urv(r, v) = uvr(r, v) > 0,  
  (iv) urr(r, v)  0,  
(v) uvv(r, v)  0,  
(vi) uvrr(r, v) = 0,  
and 
 (vii) urvv(r, v)  0.  
 
The third assumption is necessary for the self-selection condition that a cross-partial derivative 
of the utility function is positive.  The fourth and fifth assumptions imply non-increasing 
marginal utility with respect to either reliability or willingness to pay.  The sixth assumption 
indicates that a change in service reliability does not affect a cross-partial derivative of the 
utility function.  The last assumption implies that the cross-partial derivative of the utility 
function is a non-increasing function of willingness to pay.  
Given the price function p(r), consumers are assumed to choose their level of 
reliability from a service menu so as to maximize their expected surplus.  A reliability level for 
consumers whose willingness to pay is v is given by: 
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r(v) = arg. max.{u(r, v) − p(r)}.                                      (2) 
                    r 
 
For a menu of service to be consistent with utility maximization, the reliability level should be a 
non-decreasing function of the consumers’ willingness to pay, i.e., rv(v)  0.4  In addition, 
applying the envelope theorem in the theory of self-selection yields (Wilson, 1989, p.16): 
 
            ]),([ vvru
dv
dS
v= .                                              (3) 
 
Finally, the participation constraint for consumers with the lowest willingness to pay indicates: 
 
         S(v0)  u[r(v0), v0] − p(v0) = 0,                                         (4) 
   
where v0 is the lowest level of willingness to pay among consumers receiving the service, and 
p(v0) = p[r(v0)].  The service is never supplied to consumers whose willingness to pay is less 
than v0. If v0 = 0, all consumers receive the service.5  
For the rationing of supply to be efficient for the monopolist, the reliability level must 
be equal to the probability that the service is supplied (Wilson, 1989).6  That is: 
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        r(v) = F[D(v), K] = F(v, K).                                           (5) 
 
The rationing of usage can then be efficiently implemented by assigning priority to consumers 
in order of decreasing reliability.  With the knowledge about the distribution functions of 
willingness to pay and available capacity, the monopolist can design the optimal menu of 
priority service that induces consumer self-selection of r(v). 
The monopolist determines the capacity of its facilities and the lowest willingness to 
pay to maximize its expected profit.  The objective function for the unregulated monopolist is 
to maximize the following expected profit subject to (3), (4), and (5):  
 
0
1
0
)()( ccKdvvDvp
v
v −− ,                                          (6) 
 
where c0 is a fixed cost and c is the constant marginal cost of capacity.  Substituting (3), (4), 
and (5) into (6) yields the following objective function for the unregulated monopolist (see 
Appendix A for derivation): 
 
       { } −−−−
1
0,
0
0
))(()(]),,([]),,([.max
v
vvvK ccKdvvDvGvKvFuvKvFu     (7) 
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where G(v)  D(v)/[−Dv(v)].  The value of 1 − v0 indicates the market penetration of the service.  
The function G(v) implies the reciprocal of the hazard rate for the distribution of consumers’ 
willingness to pay.  As in the literature on nonlinear pricing, G(v) is non-increasing, which 
holds because of the assumption that Dvv(v)  0. 
The first-order conditions for v0 and K are: 
 
        0)()(]),,([)(]),,([ 0000000 =− vDvGvKvFuvDvKvFu vvv ,         (8) 
        
{ } cdvvDKvFvGvKvFuvKvFu vK
v
vrr =−− ))()(,()(]),,([]),,([
1
0
,      (9) 
 
The marginal cost of capacity is equal to the expected marginal revenue with respect to K, 
which exceeds the marginal willingness to pay for capacity addition.  Thus, the unregulated 
monopolist would install smaller capacity than the welfare-maximizing case.  With smaller 
capacity, the monopolist restricts demand for the service by setting a higher v0 than for the 
welfare-maximizing case where v0 = 0, thereby excluding some consumers from the market.  
Exclusion of consumers leads to loss of surplus.  The smaller capacity and market penetration 
leads to a reduction of welfare.  For the second-order conditions to hold, the expected marginal 
revenue with respect to v0 (the left-hand side of (8)) is assumed to be a decreasing function of v0, 
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and that with respect to K (the left-hand side of (9)) is assumed to be a decreasing function of K.  
 
3. EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF REGULATION 
3.1 Minimum Reliability Standard 
Reliability is a crucial attribute of quality of supply and has been subject to regulation.  
Examples include the electricity supply industry where the regulator sets minimum reliability 
standards based on engineering practice and electric utilities are required to satisfy the standards.  
As for a reliability standard, an index measuring the loss of load probability is often applied to 
the electricity supply industry.7  To satisfy the minimum reliability constraint, the monopolist 
must expand the capacity of its facilities for the service.  Thus, the application of a minimum 
reliability standard appears to contribute to capacity addition.8  
Suppose that the monopolist is obliged to supply service with reliability equal to or 
higher than R (R > 0).  Under this reliability regulation, the monopolist maximizes the 
expected profit subject to:  
 
         r(v0) = F[D(v0), K] = F(v0, K)  R ,                                     (10) 
 
Because rv(v) = FDDv > 0, a minimum reliability standard implies that the constraint is binding 
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only for the lowest level of reliability, i.e., r(v0).  Because the reliability level for v > v0 always 
exceeds r(v0), the constraint is not binding over the interval (v0, 1].  This is in contrast to the 
model of Besanko et al. (1987) where, for v > v0, the minimum quality constraint is binding over 
an interval [v0, v], and product quality is constant over [v0, v].  The Lagrangian function for the 
profit-maximizing monopolist subject to a minimum reliability standard, denoted by L, can be 
written as: 
 
{ } ]),([))(()(]),,([]),,([ 01 0
0
RKvFccKdvvDvGvKvFuvKvFuL q
v
vv −+−−−−=  λ ,   
    (11) 
 
where λq is a non-negative Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (10). 
The first-order condition for v0 is:  
 
),()()(]),,([)(]),,([ 00000000 KvFvDvGvKvFuvDvKvFu vqvvv λ−=− .  (12) 
 
Because Fv(v, K) = FDDv > 0, the right-hand side of (12) becomes negative when the minimum 
reliability constraint is binding.  Given capacity, the expected marginal revenue with respect to 
v0 becomes negative at the optimum for the monopolist subject to a binding constraint on the 
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minimum level of service reliability.  This implies that minimum reliability regulation 
aggravates surplus loss because of the exit of additional consumers from the market.  The next 
proposition confirms this. 
  
PROPOSITION 1. Under minimum reliability regulation, the profit-maximizing monopolist 
offering continuous priority service provides the service to fewer consumers than in the absence 
of regulation.  
 
PROOF. See Appendix B. 
 
The first-order condition for K is:  
 
{ } ),())()(,()(]),,([]),,([ 01
0
KvFcdvvDKvFvGvKvFuvKvFu KqvK
v
vrr λ−=−− .  
  (13) 
  
Because FK(v0, K) > 0, the second term on the right-hand side of (13) becomes negative when 
the minimum reliability constraint is binding.  Given the market penetration, the expected 
marginal revenue with respect to K at the optimum is lower than that for the unregulated 
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monopoly.  Thus, minimum reliability regulation leads to an increase in the capacity of the 
facilities, which is confirmed by the following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 2. Under minimum reliability regulation, the profit-maximizing monopolist 
offering continuous priority service installs larger capacity for the service than in the absence 
of regulation.  
 
PROOF. See Appendix B. 
 
The effect of minimum reliability regulation on price depends on consumer 
preferences.  Following (Chao and Wilson, 1987), the price of continuous priority service can 
be written as:  
 
        dtDFtKtFuKvFpKvFp
v
v
vDr+=
0
]),,([)],([)],([ 0 .                  (14) 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of (14) is the price for consumers with the lowest 
willingness to pay, while the second term is the surplus loss of consumers whose willingness to 
pay is lower than v.  The second term implies that consumers with higher priority compensate 
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for the surplus loss of consumers with lower priority.  For consumers with a high willingness 
to pay, increases in v0 and K under minimum reliability regulation lead to a lower price in 
comparison with the unregulated monopoly.  This is because the reduction in the surplus loss 
of consumers with lower values of v because of increases in v0 and K exceeds the increase in the 
price for consumers with v0.  In contrast, minimum reliability regulation raises prices for 
consumers with low willingness to pay, because a reduction in the surplus loss of consumers 
with lower values of v in response to an increase in K is lower than the increase in the price for 
consumers with v0.  
An increase in capacity under minimum reliability regulation contributes to 
improvement in reliability for all but the highest class of priority in comparison with the 
unregulated monopoly.  The improvement of service reliability raises consumer surplus.  
However, this increase in consumer surplus may be offset by a loss of surplus because of the 
exclusion of consumers with low values of v from the market.  Thus, the welfare effects of 
minimum reliability regulation are ambiguous.  
 
3.2 Rate of Return Regulation 
Rate of return regulation imposes a constraint on the return on capital.  The rate of 
return constraint is given as follows: 
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{ } −−≥
1
0
))(()(]),,([]),,([
v
vv dvvDvGvKvFuvKvFusK ,              (15) 
 
where s denotes an allowed rate of return and s > c for regulation to be effective.  The 
Lagrangian function for the profit-maximizing monopolist subject to rate of return regulation 
can be written as: 
 
{ } sKccKdvvDvGvKvFuvKvFuL r
v
vvr λλ +−−−−−= 
1
0
0
))(()(]),,([]),,([)1( , 
(16) 
where λr is a non-negative Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (15), and λr < 1.  
The first-order conditions for v0 and K are:  
 
0})()(]),,([)(]),,([){1( 0000000 =−− vDvGvKvFuvDvKvFu vvvrλ ,       (17) 
    
{ }
r
r
vK
v
vrr
cs
cdvvDKvFvGvKvFuvKvFu λ
λ
−
−
−=−− 1
)())()(,()(]),,([]),,([1
0
. 
(18) 
 
A familiar effect of rate of return regulation on capacity holds in case of continuous priority 
service: rate of return regulation results in larger capacity than in the absence of regulation (see 
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Appendix C for the proof).  This is indicated by a decrease in the effective cost of capital 
because of regulation on the right-hand side of (18).  The effect of rate of return regulation on 
market penetration is in contrast with that of a minimum reliability standard, as indicated by the 
next proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 3. Under rate of return regulation, the profit-maximizing monopolist offering 
continuous priority service provides the service to more consumers than in the absence of 
regulation.  
 
PROOF. See Appendix D. 
 
While the effects of rate of return regulation on prices depend on consumer preference 
in terms of a minimum reliability standard, its effects on consumer surplus are obvious: rate of 
return regulation raises consumer surplus in comparison with the unregulated monopoly.  
Intuitively, an increase in market penetration together with capacity addition contributes to an 
increase in surplus for all consumers receiving the service.  In fact, the improvement in 
consumer surplus, because of rate of return regulation, is confirmed by totally differentiating 
consumer surplus with respect to s:  
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))((]),,([
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1
0000
0
1
1
0
0
0



−+=
−=
−−
v
vKvrvv
v
vv
v
v
dvDvGFvKvFu
ds
dK
vDvGvKvFu
ds
dv
dvDvGvKvFu
ds
d
dvDKvFpvKvFu
ds
d
   
(19) 
 
Both terms on the right-hand side of the last equation in (19) are negative because of 
Proposition 3 and dK/ds < 0 (see Appendix C for proof).  Thus, application of rate of return 
regulation leads to an increase in consumer surplus in comparison with the unregulated 
monopoly.  
 
3.3 Price Cap Regulation 
Suppose that a ceiling, denoted by P, is placed on the price schedule of the service 
provided by the monopolist.  Because p/v = pr[F(D(v), K)]FDDv > 0, the constraint is binding 
only on the price of the highest priority and the constraint is not binding on prices for v < V.  
This is in contrast with the model of Besanko et al. (1987) in which for v < V, a price constraint 
is binding over an interval [v, V] and the price is constant over [v, V].  From (3) and (4), the 
price under efficient rationing can be written as: 
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      −=
v
v
v dttKtFuvKvFuKvFp
0
]),,([]),,([)],([ .                        (20) 
 
Using (20), the price cap constraint is written as:  
 
 PdvvKvFuKFu
v
v ≤− 
1
0
]),,([]1),,1([ .                                 (21) 
 
The Lagrangian function for the profit-maximizing monopolist under price cap regulation is:  
 
{ } )]},1([{))(()(]),,([]),,([1 0
0
KFpPccKdvvDvGvKvFuvKvFuL p
v
vv −+−−−−=  λ , 
                                                                         (22) 
where λp is a Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (21). 
The first-order conditions for v0 and K are: 
 
]),,([)()(]),,([)(]),,([ 000000000 vKvFuvDvGvKvFuvDvKvFu vpvvv λ=− , 
                                                                    (23) 
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1
1
0
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−−


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  (24) 
  
Because uvr > 0 and FK(v, K) > 0, the second term on the right-hand side of (24) is negative.  
The third term on the right-hand side of (24) equals zero because the highest reliability, which is 
equal to F(1, K), is always equal to unity and is not affected by any change in capacity.  Thus, 
given the market penetration, the expected marginal revenue with respect to K is lower under 
price cap regulation than that under the unregulated monopoly.  In fact, price cap regulation 
leads to an increase in capacity. 
 
PROPOSITION 4. If a ceiling is imposed on the price of the service, the profit-maximizing 
monopolist offering continuous priority service installs larger capacity than in the absence of 
regulation. 
 
PROOF. See Appendix E.  
 
The next proposition indicates that the monopolist lowers the optimal value of v0 if the 
service price is capped.  
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PROPOSITION 5. If a price ceiling is imposed on the price of the service, the profit-maximizing 
monopolist offering continuous priority service provides the service to more consumers than in 
the absence of regulation. 
 
PROOF. See Appendix F. 
 
As in a minimum reliability standard and rate of return regulation, whether the 
application of price cap regulation leads to a price decrease for each class depends on consumer 
preferences.  Price cap regulation raises consumer surplus in comparison with the unregulated 
monopoly because Propositions 4 and 5 imply that both terms on the right-hand side of the 
following equation, which indicates the regulatory effects on consumer surplus, become 
negative:  
 
.))((]),,([)()(]),,([
))]}(,([]),,([{
1
0000
0
1
0
0


−+=
−−
v
vKvrvv
v
v
dvDvGFvKvFu
dP
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vDvGvKvFu
dP
dv
dvDKvFpvKvFu
dP
d
 
 
An increase in market penetration together with capacity addition raises the surplus of 
consumers under price cap regulation as well as under rate of return regulation.  These 
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consumers would be excluded from the market in the absence of regulation.  
 
4. PRIORITY SERVICE WITH FINITE CLASSES 
The previous sections assume a continuous set of classes of priority service.  In 
practice, however, priority classes are discrete because of a technical or institutional difficulty in 
continuously differentiating service reliability.  In the electricity supply industry, two distinct 
classes of priority, say, ‘standard’ and ‘interruptible’ classes are often applied to consumers.  
This section applies the model in the previous sections to discrete priority service to examine 
whether the results for continuous priority service also hold for the discrete case.  
 
4.1 Unregulated Monopolist 
Each priority class of the service is defined as the interval of willingness to pay for the 
service; [v0, v1], [v1, v2], [v2, v3],..., [vn-1, vn], where 0 < v0 < v1 < v2 < ... < vn-1 < vn = 1.  The 
service reliability for class i, denoted by ri, is defined as: 
 

−
−
=
−
)(
)(
1
1 ),()()(
1 i
i
vD
vD
ii
i dXKXF
vDvD
r ,       i = 1,..., n.        (25) 
 
Equation (25) implies that consumers in each priority class are assumed to be rationed at 
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random within that class when the available capacity is insufficient to supply the entire class 
(Chao et al., 1988).  Note that in contrast with the continuous class case, the reliability for the 
first priority class is no longer equal to unity and thus reliability is affected by a change in 
capacity.  
The incentive compatibility constraint implies that consumers whose willingness to 
pay is equal to vi must be indifferent between the class i, [vi-1, vi], and class i + 1, [vi, vi+1].  
Then, the price for class i + 1 is defined as pi+1 = pi + u(ri+1, vi) − u(ri, vi).  This can be 
rewritten as: 
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          p1  =  u(r1 , v0).                                                (27) 
 
Equation (27) holds because of an individual rationality constraint for consumers with v0.  
The monopolist determines K and vi (i = 0,..., n-1) to maximize its expected profit 
subject to constraints (25), (26), and (27).  The expected revenue of the monopolist is defined 
as: 
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where D(vn) = D(1) = 0.  Substituting (26) and (27) into (28) yields: 
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For the monopolist offering discrete priority service, marginal revenue with respect to 
v0 is given by: 
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Marginal revenue with respect to vi for i > 0 is given by: 
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i = 1,..., n-1.   (31) 
 
The first-order conditions for vi indicate that marginal revenue with respect to vi is equal to zero 
for all i = 0,..., n-1.  Marginal revenue with respect to K, which is equal to the marginal cost of 
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capacity at the optimum, is given by: 
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The second-order conditions for profit maximization are assumed to hold for the case of discrete 
priority service. 
 
4.2 Effects of Alternative Forms of Regulation 
Minimum reliability standard 
Suppose that the monopolist offering priority service with a finite number of classes 
must satisfy the constraint r1 ≥ R.  Then, the first-order condition of profit maximization for v0 
is: 
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when the minimum reliability constraint is binding.  The right-hand side of (33) becomes 
positive because r1/v0 > 0 (see Appendix G for the proof).  Given capacity, the application of 
the minimum reliability regulation appears to raise v0, relative to the unregulated case.  In fact, 
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totally differentiating R − r1 = 0 and applying the implicit function theorem yields: 
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Thus, Proposition 1, which indicates a decrease in market penetration because of a minimum 
reliability standard, also holds in the discrete case. 
The first-order condition of profit maximization for K is: 
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Because r1/K > 0, (35) indicates that a minimum reliability standard reduces the effective 
marginal cost of capacity in comparison to the unregulated case.  Given market penetration, a 
decrease in the effective marginal cost of capacity leads to an expansion of capacity.  The 
effect on capacity of minimum reliability regulation is confirmed by totally differentiating R − 
r1 = 0 and by applying the implicit function theorem: 
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Thus, Proposition 2, which indicates an increase in capacity because of a minimum reliability 
standard, also holds in the discrete case.  The effects of minimum reliability regulation on 
market penetration and capacity are consistent with those found in continuous priority service. 
 
Rate of return regulation 
When rate of return regulation is applied to the monopolist offering discrete priority 
service, the right-hand side of (15) is replaced by total revenue defined in (29).  Then the 
first-order conditions for v0 and K are: 
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The capacity-enhancing effect of rate of return regulation also holds for discrete 
priority classes because totally differentiating the rate of return constraint with equality, 
applying the implicit function theorem and substituting (38) yields: 
 
      0
1
<
−
−
−=
r
cs
K
ds
dK
λ
   . 
 
The effect of rate of return regulation on market penetration is not obvious in the case of 
discrete priority service because the monopolist determines not only v0 but also v1, ..., vn–1, 
whose values depend on s.  The effect of rate of return regulation on v0 depends on dvi/ds (i = 
1,..., n–1), which has a complicated form.9 
 
Price cap regulation 
Suppose that the monopolist offering discrete priority service must satisfy the 
constraint that P ≥ pn.  Then, the first-order condition of profit maximization for v0 is: 
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The effect of price cap regulation for discrete priority service depends on the term pn/v0, 
which corresponds to p[F(1, K)]/v0 for continuous priority service.  As in the continuous 
case, pn/v0 is positive (see Appendix H for the proof).  Thus, price cap regulation for discrete 
priority service leads to larger market penetration than in the absence of regulation.  This is 
confirmed by totally differentiating P − pn = 0 and applying the implicit function theorem: 
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The increase in market penetration because of price cap regulation for discrete priority service is 
consistent with Proposition 5 for the continuous case. 
The first-order condition for K is: 
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The sign of pn/K in (41) depends on how capacity affects the surplus of the highest class 
consumers (the first term on the right-hand side of (41)) and surplus loss of lower class 
consumers because of the existence of the highest class (the second term on the right-hand side 
of (41)).  On the one hand, capacity expansion raises the surplus of the highest class consumers 
through an increase in the reliability level for the highest class.  On the other hand, capacity 
expansion lowers the surplus loss of lower class consumers because of the existence of the 
highest class consumers, by raising reliability levels for all consumers receiving the service.  In 
contrast with the continuous case where capacity does not affect the surplus of the highest class 
consumers, the reliability for the highest priority class is raised by addition to capacity because 
consumers with v = 1 and those with v = vn–1 < 1 face the same reliability under discrete priority 
service. 
If the reduction in the surplus loss exceeds the gain in the surplus, pn/K < 0, and the 
application of a price ceiling leads to larger capacity than the unregulated case.  This is 
because totally differentiating P − p1 = 0 and applying the implicit function theorem yields: 
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The capital-enhancing effect of price cap regulation for discrete priority service is consistent 
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with the continuous case.  However, the application of price cap regulation leads to lower 
capacity than the unregulated case if the gain in the surplus for the highest priority class exceeds 
the reduction in the surplus loss for lower priority classes, i.e., pn/K > 0. 
Note that when n = 1, p1/K > 0 from (41).  For the nondifferentiated product case 
of n = 1, the application of a price ceiling leads to lower capacity than the unregulated case.  
This adverse effect of price cap regulation on investment under distributed preferences for 
service is consistent with the literature on price cap regulation for nondifferentiated products 
that indicates an incentive for the regulated monopolist to underinvest in quality (Armstrong et 
al., 1994, p.173). 
 
4.3 A Comparison of Alternative Forms of Regulation: A Numerical Example with Two Priority 
Classes 
The effects of alternative regulatory forms on prices, consumer surplus and welfare are 
difficult to establish.  Using a numerical example with two priority classes, these effects are 
compared among three forms of regulation.10  The available capacity distributes according to a 
function F(X, K) = 1 − (X/K), and the willingness to pay for the service distributes according to 
a function D(v) = 1 − v.  The expected utility is the product of the willingness to pay and 
reliability, i.e., u = vr.  Three first-order conditions for K, v0, and v1 and a regulatory constraint 
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with equality under each regulatory scheme are simultaneously solved by a numerical method. 
Table 1 summarizes the optimal values of key variables for the cases c = 0.2 and c0 = 0.  
For comparison, the allowed rate of return is set equal to the rate of return on capital at the 
optimum under a minimum reliability standard with R = 0.6, and a price ceiling equal to p2 at 
the optimum under rate of return regulation.  Rate of return regulation results in larger capacity 
and more consumers subscribing to the service than a minimum reliability standard with an 
identical rate of return.  A minimum reliability standard leads to higher reliability levels and 
prices for both priority classes than rate of return regulation that sets s equal to the rate of return 
under a minimum reliability standard with R = 0.6.  A minimum reliability standard with R = 
0.6 worsens both consumer surplus and welfare, while rate of return regulation contributes to an 
improvement in consumer surplus and welfare.  The improvement in consumer surplus and 
welfare is also found in the case of price cap regulation that sets P equal to p2 under rate of 
return regulation.  In comparison to rate of return regulation, the effects on capacity and 
market penetration of price cap regulation are modest because a price ceiling, which is set equal 
to the optimal value of p2 under rate of return regulation, is slightly lower than the optimal value 
of p2 under the unregulated monopoly.  Thus, rate of return regulation leads to larger consumer 
surplus and welfare than price cap regulation. 
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      [Table 1 here] 
 
5. APPLICATION: ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY 
Priority service has relevance to the practice of regulating electricity supply industries 
where interruptible rates are available on an optional basis.  The insights of the analysis of 
regulatory effects on capacity and market penetration that are determined by the monopolist 
offering priority service have important implications for regulatory policy of electricity supply 
industries.  The insufficient capacity of electrical networks and the exit of low-cost generators 
restrict opportunities for power trade, thereby reducing welfare gains from competitive markets.  
For liberalized power markets to be efficient, appropriate schemes should be applied to the 
regulation of transmission and distribution sectors. 
 
5.1 Electricity Distribution 
Interruptible rates have been investigated (Tschirhart and Jen, 1979; Woo and Toyama, 
1986; Smith, 1989; Tan and Varaiya, 1993) and are provided on an optional basis mainly to 
commercial and industrial customers receiving service from electricity distribution utilities.  
Prices of interruptible services are discounted according to the number and duration of outages 
over certain time intervals.  In electricity distribution in some European countries, price cap 
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regulation has recently replaced rate of return regulation because price cap regulation involves 
less regulatory costs and provides more incentive for cost reduction.  Price cap regulation, 
however, raises a concern about unreliable supply of service because of a lack of incentive for 
investment (Armstrong et al., 1994, p.173). 
In the case of discrete priority service, the effect of price cap regulation on investment 
is not obvious.  If price cap regulation leads to insufficient investment, residential customers 
who subscribe to standard rates (i.e., high-priority classes) and rely on power supply from local 
distribution utilities may receive lower surplus than rate of return regulation, which provides the 
distribution utility with much incentive for investment.  For the regulator whose primary 
concern is constraining price levels, however, the application of price cap regulation is justified 
on the ground that it leads to a larger number of customers subscribing to the service.   The 
increase in market penetration is particularly beneficial for some business customers who can 
easily switch to inexpensive backup generators upon interruption of the utility’s service. 
Minimum reliability regulation is not desirable for priority service because it restricts 
demand for low reliability, thereby leading to loss of surplus of some business customers 
preferring inexpensive power supply from the distribution utility.  Alternatively, the regulator 
can impose a constraint on the average reliability level of distribution utilities.  In essence, the 
effects of average reliability regulation on market penetration and capacity are similar to those 
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of a minimum reliability standard; reliability regulation leads to larger capacity but lower 
market penetration than in the absence of regulation.  See Appendix I for details of the effects 
of average revenue regulation. 
In countries that apply price cap regulation of the RPI-X form to electricity 
distribution, such as the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom, service reliability 
is also regulated along with other attributes of supply quality.  In Norway, for example, the 
regulator sets a target for reliability that is defined as the expected outage costs, and applies 
either penalty or reward to the utility depending on the difference between the expected and 
actual outage costs (Gronli, 2003).  The Netherlands and the United Kingdom also apply 
similar forms of performance-based regulation that set targets for service reliability in terms of 
the number of supply interruptions and duration of outages (Tahvanainen et al., 2004).  In 
Spain, distribution utilities must satisfy minimum standards on outage occurrence and duration, 
and these utilities are penalized when they fail to satisfy the standards (Rothwell and Gomez, 
2003). 
These additional schemes of quality regulation are effective in preventing 
underinvestment.11  However, they incur additional regulatory costs for enforcing standards 
and targets that may offset a cost reduction induced by RPI-X regulation.  In addition, 
reliability regulation may have an adverse effect on the market penetration of the distribution 
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service and may exclude customers preferring inexpensive service from the market if 
interruptible rates are applied to the distribution service. 
 
5.2 Electricity Transmission 
Reliability management of electric power systems, which used to be implemented 
through coordination among regulated utilities, is one of the main issues in deregulated 
electricity markets.  The efficient management of system reliability is a crucial factor for the 
generation sector to be competitive because generators rely on transmission networks to send 
power to consumers.  Reliability-differentiated pricing such as priority service can be applied 
to electricity transmission as an efficient method of reliability management (Chao and Peck, 
1998; Woo et al., 1998; Deng and Oren, 2001).  Examples include tariff options of ‘firm’ and 
‘non-firm’ transmission services in the PJM Regional Transmission Organization in the United 
States.   Even if the number of classes is two, efficiency gain from priority service in the short 
run is sufficient in comparison to random rationing such as rotating outages (Chao and Wilson, 
1987; Wilson, 1989). 
In the long run, the way to promote transmission investment in competitive power 
markets is one of the most challenging tasks for reliability management because there has been 
a growing concern about reliability of transmission networks (Joskow, 2005).  To promote 
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transmission investment, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 requires U.S. transmission utilities, 
which have been subject to rate of return regulation, to comply with reliability standards set and 
enforced by an Electric Reliability Organization (Young, 2006).  The combination of rate of 
return regulation with reliability standards is expected to secure reliability of transmission 
networks as both regulatory schemes contribute to an increase in capacity.  However, this 
combination of regulatory schemes may discourage competition in generation if the adverse 
effect on market penetration of reliability standards is dominant. 
The effect of regulation on market penetration is important in the long run when 
generators in competitive markets receive reliability-differentiated transmission service from the 
monopolist owning and operating transmission networks.  A minimum reliability standard 
reduces market penetration, thereby discouraging competition among generators.  Thus, a 
minimum reliability standard applied to the transmission sector has an adverse impact on 
competition in generation markets.  In contrast, price cap regulation, which has been applied to 
the transmission sector of such countries as Argentina, Norway and the United Kingdom 
(Armstrong et al., 1994; Braton, 1997; Rudnick and Raineri, 1997), increases the number of 
generators receiving reliability-differentiated transmission service, thereby encouraging 
competition in generation.  This procompetitive effect of price cap regulation is expected to 
increase efficiency in power markets. 
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Joskow (2005) argues that regulatory schemes for transmission investment should be 
designed to strike a proper balance between reliability and price.  As is often the case in 
engineering practice, if the regulator highly values reliability levels for all discrete classes of 
priority service, constraining the minimum or average reliability level can be justified as an 
effective regulatory scheme.  Rate of return regulation is also effective in achieving a reliable 
supply of transmission service.  If a price reduction in the transmission service is a major 
concern for the regulator, price cap regulation has an appealing feature of securing low price 
levels.  The imposition of a price ceiling on reliability-differentiated tariffs of electricity 
transmission deserves consideration if the regulatory agency puts more priority on promoting 
competition in generation than on a secure supply of transmission service. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper addresses the issue of how to regulate a monopolist that offers priority 
service to consumers.  Although priority service has been extensively analyzed in the literature, 
an explicit analysis of how regulatory schemes affect priority service in the long run has seldom 
been conducted.  Using a model for both continuous and discrete priority classes, this paper 
investigates the effects of alternative regulatory schemes on market penetration and capacity of 
the facilities of the monopolist.  In comparison to an unregulated monopoly, a minimum 
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reliability standard, rate of return regulation and price cap regulation raise the capacity of the 
facilities in case of continuous priority service.  For discrete priority service, capital-enhancing 
effects of a minimum reliability standard and rate of return regulation are also found, but the 
effect of price cap regulation on capacity is ambiguous.  In contrast with a minimum reliability 
standard that reduces market penetration, price cap regulation increases market penetration for 
both continuous and discrete classes of priority service.  Rate of return regulation also 
increases market penetration in case of continuous priority service, but the effect of rate of 
return regulation on market penetration is not obvious in case of discrete priority service. 
Because price cap regulation mitigates the adverse effect of the monopoly on market 
penetration, it contributes to promoting competition in generation markets where generators 
often rely on transmission service from the monopolist owning and operating the electrical 
networks.  Rate of return regulation provides the transmission and distribution monopolists 
offering priority service with much greater incentive to increase capacity, thereby contributing 
to the mitigation of concerns about secure supply of electricity.  Minimum reliability regulation 
contributes to the improvement in reliability for all classes of priority but it aggravates the exit 
of additional consumers from the market. 
In practice, a dominant form of implementing priority service is the provision of two 
classes of service reliability.  Examples include the electricity supply industry where customers 
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can choose either standard or interruptible rates.  There has been a growing concern about 
service reliability in the electricity supply industry as a global trend toward liberalization has 
emerged.  A series of large-scale collapses of electric power systems occurring in North 
America, Scandinavia and Italy in 2003 confirmed the importance of securing a reliable supply 
of electricity in competitive power markets. 
To secure reliable power supply, reliability standards have been applied to the 
transmission and distribution sectors in many countries.  These standards depend on the type of 
interruption (planned or unplanned), outage duration, voltage levels, and regional features 
affecting power supply.  Although this paper does not explicitly take account of these attributes 
in the regulatory analysis of priority service, it does indicate that when market penetration is 
important, reliability standards may be harmful under either price cap regulation, which has 
recently been applied to the transmission and distribution sectors of some European countries, 
or under rate of return regulation, which is still a dominant form of regulating the transmission 
and distribution sectors in the United States. 
 
NOTES 
1.  Notable exceptions are studies on second-best priority pricing, which investigate a 
two-dimensional priority service that maximizes welfare subject to a revenue constraint (Wilson, 
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1989; Spulber, 1992). 
 
2.  Prices for consumers with low willingness to pay could be negative if priority service is 
Pareto superior to the single-price service with random rationing.  The case of a negative price 
for service is beyond the scope in this paper. 
 
3.  All properties except uvrr(r, v) = 0 are also assumed in Besanko et al. (1987).  Chao and 
Wilson (1987) also assume that uvrr(r, v) = 0. 
 
4.  Combining the assumption that urv > 0 with the second-order condition of utility 
maximization, urr − prr < 0, implies that rv(v) ≥ 0.  Totally differentiating S(v) = u[r(v), v] − p(v) 
and using the first-order condition of utility maximization, ur − pr = 0, yields (3). 
 
5.  To focus on the regulatory effect on market penetration, this paper does not consider the 
case where the regulator forces the monopolist to provide service to all consumers, i.e., v0 = 0. 
 
6.  The profit-maximizing monopoly solution for priority service requires efficient rationing 
(Chao et al., 1988, p.82) 
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7.  Reliability standards are investigated from an economic perspective by Telson (1975), Crew 
and Kleindorfer (1978), and Munasinghe and Gellerson (1979). 
 
8.  An alternative way of regulating reliability is to impose a constraint on the average level of 
supply reliability.  As in a minimum reliability standard, the average reliability regulation 
reduces market penetration and expands capacity compared to the unregulated monopoly case.  
Details of these effects are discussed in Appendix I. 
 
9.  For instance, the effect of s on v0 for n = 2 is given by: 
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where MRij denotes a cross-partial derivative of the expected marginal revenue with respect to 
ith and jth variables. 
 
10.  The functional forms of supply probability, demand and utility in this section are the same 
as those assumed for the numerical example in Chao et al. (1988). 
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11.  An alternative mechanism of securing supply reliability is to impose capacity obligations 
on distribution companies.  See Joskow and Tirole (2006) for the effects of such mechanisms. 
 
 
APPENDIX A: Derivation of the objective function of the unregulated monopolist 
From (1) and (5), the expected profit of the monopolist in (6) can be written as: 
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where the expected surplus, S(v), is a function of consumer’s willingness to pay for the service. 
Integrating the last term in (A1) by parts yields: 
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Substituting (3) and (4) into the right-hand side of (A2) yields: 
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From (A1) and (A3), we have the expected profit of the monopolist in (7). 
 
APPENDIX B: Proof of Propositions 1 and 2 
Under the binding constraint on a minimum reliability level, the optimal values of K 
and v0 must satisfy the following equation: 
 
           R – F[D(v0), K] = 0.                                             (A4) 
 
Totally differentiating (A4) and applying the implicit function theorem yields: 
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Inequalities (A5) and (A6) imply that an increase in the minimum reliability standard leads to 
larger capacity and lower market penetration. 
Q.E.D. 
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APPENDIX C: Proof of the capital-enhancing effect of rate of return regulation 
Under the binding rate of return constraint on capital, the optimal value of K must 
satisfy the following equation: 
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Totally differentiating (A7), applying the implicit function theorem and substituting (18) yields: 
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Inequality (A8) indicates that a decrease in the allowed rate of return leads to capacity 
expansion. 
                                                                    Q.E.D. 
 
APPENDIX D: Proof of Proposition 3 
The expected surplus for consumers with v can be written as: 
 
          S = u[F(v, K), v] − p[F(v, K)].                                       (A9) 
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For consumers with v0, totally differentiating (A9) with S = 0 yields: 
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(A10) 
 
Substituting the first-order condition for utility maximization, dp/dr = ur, into (A10) yields: 
 
          uv[F(v0, K), v0] = 0.                                              (A11) 
 
Note that (A11) holds for such cases as rate of return regulation and price cap regulation where 
no constraint is imposed on reliability.  Totally differentiating marginal revenue with respect to 
v0 at the optimum, which is equal to zero from (17) for r > 0, and substituting (A11) leads to: 
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where MRv0v0 denotes a second-partial derivative of expected marginal revenue of the 
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monopolist.  For the second-order conditions to hold, MRv0v0 must be negative.  Thus, from 
(A8), dv0/ds > 0 in (A12).  This implies that a reduction in the allowed rate of return leads to an 
increase in market penetration. 
                                                                    Q.E.D. 
 
APPENDIX E: Proof of Proposition 4 
Under the binding constraint on prices, the following equation must hold at the 
optimum: 
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Totally differentiating (A13) and applying the implicit function theorem yields: 
 
       0
]),,([
1
1
0
<−=
v Kvr dvFvKvFu
dP
dK
.                                (A14) 
 
Inequality (A14) indicates that a decrease in the price cap leads to capacity expansion. 
                                                                       Q.E.D. 
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APPENDIX F: Proof of Proposition 5 
From Appendix D, (A11) also holds in the case of price cap regulation.  Substituting 
(A11) into (23) leads to u[F(v0, K), v0] = 0.  Totally differentiating u[F(v0, K), v0] = 0 yields: 
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Because uv[F(v0, K), v0] = 0 and dK/dP < 0 from Proposition 4, (A15) indicates that dv0/dP > 0.  
Thus, a decrease in the price cap leads to an increase in market penetration. 
                                                                    Q.E.D. 
 
APPENDIX G: Proof of r1/v0 > 0 
From (25), differentiating r1 with respect to v0 yields: 
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Because F[D(v0), K] = r(v0) < r1, the right-hand side of (A16) is positive. 
                                                                       Q.E.D. 
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APPENDIX H: Proof of pn/v0 > 0 
From (26) and (27), the price for the highest priority can be written as: 
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Given v1, v2, ..., vn–1, a change in v0 does not affect reliability of the ith class for i > 1.  Thus, 
differentiating (A17) with respect to v0 yields: 
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Substituting (A16) into (A18) yields: 
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                                                                        (A19) 
 
The third term on the right-hand side of (A19) is positive because Dv(v) < 0 and urv(r, v) > 0. 
Approximating D(v) by a Taylor deployment around v = v0, the first and second terms 
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on the right-hand side of (A19) can be written as: 
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                                                                        (A20) 
 
The second term on the right-hand side of (A20) becomes nonnegative, because Dvv(v0) ≤ 0.  
According to the mean value theorem: 
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where uv(0, v) = 0.  Substituting (A21) and (A22) into (A20) yields: 
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Because urvv(r, v) ≤ 0 and uvrr(r, v) = 0, urv(r, v0) − urv(r1, v) ≥ 0, for 0 < r < r1 and v0 < v < v1.  
Thus, both the first and second terms in (A20) become nonnegative, and the right-hand side of 
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(A19) becomes positive. 
                                             Q.E.D. 
 
APPENDIX I: Effects of average reliability regulation on market penetration and capacity 
Suppose that the profit-maximizing monopolist offering continuous priority service is 
subject to a binding constraint on the average reliability level, denoted by ra.  The constraint on 
average reliability level can be written as: 
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where Ra indicates the regulated level of reliability.  Totally differentiating Ra − ra = 0 and 
applying the implicit function theorem leads to: 
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Because FD < 0, the term in parentheses on the right-hand side of (A25) must be negative.  
Thus, dv0/dRa > 0, and the application of average revenue regulation reduces market penetration 
in comparison to the unregulated case for continuous priority service.  For discrete priority 
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service, the constraint on average reliability can be written as: 
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which is the same as the reliability constraint in the continuous case.  Thus, dv0/dRa > 0, and 
the application of average revenue regulation reduces market penetration for discrete priority 
service.  As for the regulatory effect on capacity, totally differentiating Ra − ra = 0 and 
applying the implicit function theorem also leads to dK/dRa > 0 for both continuous and discrete 
classes of priority service.  Thus, for both cases, applying average reliability regulation raises 
capacity in comparison to the unregulated monopoly case. 
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Table 1 Optimal values of key variables with two priority classes: c = 0.2 and c0 = 0 
 
        No regulation  Min. reliability  Rate of return    Price cap   Welfare optimal 
(R = 0.6000)    (s = 0.3236)   (P = 0.5623) 
v0          0.6360       0.7006         0.6046       0.6297           0.2720 
K           0.4249      0.4437         0.4889        0.4280          0.8498 
v1          0.8180       0.9444         0.8023        0.8052          0.6360 
r1          0.3575       0.6000         0.3934        0.3398          0.3575 
r2          0.7858       0.9374         0.7978        0.7724          0.7858 
p1          0.2274      0.4204          0.2378        0.2140          0.0972 
p2          0.5778       0.7390         0.5623        0.5623           0.3697 
Rate of      0.3449      0.3236         0.3236         0.3437          0.2000 
  return 
Profit       0.0616      0.0548         0.0604          0.0615              0 
Consumer   0.0308       0.0274         0.0387         0.0315          0.1231 
Surplus 
Welfare     0.0923       0.0822         0.0991          0.0930         0.1231 
 
